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Once in Doubt
SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
The doctrine of constitutional doubt stands in Supreme Court
jurisprudence as a touchstone of judicial caution. We are told that when the
"validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided."' In most of its
applications, this principle makes sense. But is it at least sometimes
preferable to stake a decision on constitutional grounds when a statutory
alternative presents itself? I argue that it is; that in 1985, the Supreme Court
declined to do so; and that the recent district court ruling in SEC v. Park'
demonstrates the price that we are paying for its error.
I
Gun Soo Oh Park is known to his readers as Tokyo Joe. In 1997 and
1998, Park gained notoriety as an Internet stock-picking guru. He began by
posting messages to financial bulletin boards, and in July 1998, he
established a website at tokyojoe.com. Part of this site was accessible only
to paying subscribers of Socidt6 Anonyme, a corporation that Park
established. Park posted his stock picks at his site, operated a members-only
chat room (to which he often contributed) and sent out stock alerts by e-
mail to his subscribers. Over the following year, Park's paid following grew
to 3800, generating more than $1 million in revenue.
1. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
2. 99 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
3. Id. at 891-92.
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The litany of charges that the SEC brought against Park will sound
familiar to those versed in cyberspace boiler-room antics. The SEC charged
that Park engaged in "scalping" by failing to disclose his interests in stocks
and then manipulating the prices of those stocks through his
recommendations for his own financial gain. It charged that he acted as a
tout by accepting undisclosed compensation in return for promoting a
company's stock. It further accused him of outright misrepresentation,
saying that he falsified his track record and lied about his own buying and
selling activities.4 Based on these allegations, the SEC charged Park with
fraud under the Investment Advisers Act (IAA). 5
Park defended himself by arguing that he did not give out
"personalized" advice and was thus not an investment adviser who could
be charged with fraud under the Act.6 To understand the significance of this
distinction, we must turn to the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Lowe v.
SEC.7
The Investment Advisers Act does not, by its terms, distinguish
between personalized and impersonal advice. Rather, it excludes from
coverage "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or
business or financial publication of general and regular circulation." 8 In
Lowe, the Supreme Court considered whether the SEC could force the
publisher of an investment newsletter to register as an investment adviser.9
The SEC had interpreted the publisher exemption to apply only when the
publication was "not primarily a vehicle for distributing investment
4. Id. at 892.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1) to -6(2) (1994). The SEC also charged Park with securities fraud
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994), and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, as well as with a violation of section 17(b) of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1994). Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 892. For a discussion of the SEC's
complaint against Park written before the district court's decision, see Charles R. Mills,
Enforcement Program Against Internet Publishers Tests Limits of Investment Advisers Act,
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELECTRONIC AGE, Feb. 2000, at 1.
6. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Park also argued that the SEC had failed to state a lOb-5 claim
with respect to its allegations of material omissions since he was not under a fiduciary duty to
disclose those facts to his subscribers. The court disagreed. Id. at 898-900. In addition, Park
argued that his statements were not made "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities"
as required by Rule lob-5. Id. at 898. The court found a sufficient nexus, and refused to dismiss
on this ground as well. Id. at 900. Finally, the court rejected Park's Rule 9(b) objection to the
insufficient particularity of the SEC's fraud accusations. Id. at 900-01. This Case Note is
concerned with the application of the Investment Advisers Act, rather than these other aspects of
the ruling.
7. 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)( 11)(D) (1994).
9. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183. The IAA contains not only antifraud provisions, but also a broad
requirement that investment advisers register with the SEC before engaging in business. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(a) (1994). In Lowe, there was no evidence of fraud on the part of the publisher. The
SEC's accusations were based principally on his failure to register. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 184-86.
Notably, the SEC in Park did not accuse the defendant of violating the registration provision
(despite the fact that he was unregistered, see Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 891), no doubt to avoid the
potential constitutional issues that might have arisen.
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advice." "0 Lowe argued that the registration provision, so construed, was an
unconstitutional prior restraint on the financial press."
Avoiding this constitutional argument, the Court rejected the SEC's
interpretation of the IAA in favor of a broader statutory reading of the
publisher exemption. Culling from the legislative history, it held that
Congress's primary concern was with those who gave personalized advice
to specific clients. 2 Lowe did not fall within this category. 3 While basing
its decision on statutory grounds, the Court strongly intimated that its
interpretation was driven by constitutional considerations. 4
Justice White, joined by two others, concurred only in the result. He
criticized the Court's statutory interpretation as being inconsistent with the
legislative history and insufficiently deferential to the SEC. 5 He would
have decided the case by holding the registration provision unconstitutional
as applied.'6 Justice White thought that imposing a professional licensing
requirement on one who does no more than render advice is constitutional
only where the advice given is tailored to the recipient and a "personal
nexus" exists between the speaker and his advisee. 17 An impersonal
publisher like Lowe did not meet this standard.
At first glance, the majority and concurring opinions may seem similar.
They both led to the same result and relied at least in part on the concept of
personalization. The consequences of the majority route, however, were far-
reaching. Because the majority staked its decision on the statutory
10. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 216 (White, J., concurring in the result) (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 189 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 207-08 ("The Act was designed to apply to those persons ... who provide
personalized advice attuned to a client's concerns ...."); see also id. at 210 ("As long as the
communications between petitioners and their subscribers remain entirely impersonal and do not
develop into the kind of fiduciary, person-to-person relationships ... that are characteristic of
investment adviser-client relationships, we believe the publications are, at least presumptively,
within the exclusion and thus not subject to registration under the Act.").
13. Id. at 211. The Court also noted that Lowe's publications met the remaining criteria for
statutory exclusion, being "bona fide" and of "general and regular circulation." Id. at 208-09.
14. See id. at 204-05 (stating that Congress was "undoubtedly aware" of the Court's earlier
precedents on prior restraints).
15. Id. at 213-27 (White, J., concurring in the result).
16. Id. at 236.
17. See id. at 232 ("One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to
exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual needs and
circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession.... Where the
personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to
be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is
directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation of
professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or
publishing as such ...."); see also Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 477-78 (D.D.C. 1999)
(applying the Lowe concurrence's constitutional standard). Justice White's constitutional
distinction between publishers and professionals may have its roots in state court decisions that
protected unlicensed legal publishers from statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law.
See, e.g., In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Mo. 1978); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (App. Div.), rev'd and dissenting opinion adopted by 234 N.E.2d 459
(N.Y. 1967); Or. State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913,916 (Or. 1975).
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definition of an investment adviser, its holding excluded impersonal
publishers not only from the registration requirement, but also from the
antifraud provisions of the IAA, which of course do not pose any
constitutional issue at all.'8 The concurrence's approach would have
excused impersonal publishers from the registration requirement but left the
antifraud provisions in force. 9 The majority's decision has been widely
criticized for impairing the SEC's ability to enforce the antifraud provisions
of the IAA.20
II
SEC enforcement capability may not be the most serious casualty of the
Lowe majority. That opinion also threatens the constitutional freedom of the
press. To see why, we must return to Park and observe how Lowe shaped
the district court's handling of the case.
The Park court rejected the defendant's claims that he provided only
impersonal advice." It based its decision on four factors: (1) that Park
"allegedly sent e-mails directly to individual e-mail accounts, advising
subscribers individually through their e-mail accounts of stock picks"; (2)
that Park "answered individual questions posited by subscribers in [his]
chat room"; (3) that "[Park] discussed [his] stock picks in the chat rooms"
and that "Park's [stock] picks may have become or are the subscriber's
picks"; and (4) that Park may have been "tailoring [his] advice to the needs
of a certain category of individuals who would subscribe to an Internet
stock picking web site as opposed to the general public." 
22
18. Fraudulent speech is not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
19. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring in the result).
20. See, e.g., Lori Denise Coffman, Note, Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission: The
Deterioration of Financial Newsletter Regulation, 10 NOVA L.J. 1267, 1293 (1986); David B.
Levant, Note, Financial Columnists as Investment Advisers: After Lowe and Carpenter, 74 CAL.
L. REV. 2061, 2089 (1986); Stacy P. Thompson, Comment, Lowe v. SEC: Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 Clashes with First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 21 U. RICH. L.
REV. 205, 224 (1986).
21. Because the court was ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, it assumed the facts as alleged by the
SEC. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
22. Id. at 895-96. In addition, the district court held that Park was not entitled to the
publisher's exclusion (1) because his publications were not bona fide since he was acting as a tout,
and (2) because they were not of general and regular circulation. Id. As to the first point, a person
engaged in touting or scalping pursues a purely promotional, and perhaps fraudulent, activity and
is therefore already subject to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, if any. Lowe, 472 U.S.
at 224-25 (White, J., concurring in the result); see also Carol E. Garver, Note, Lowe v. SEC: The
First Amendment Status of Investment Advice Newsletters, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 1253, 1283-84
(1986) (arguing that "interested" publishers, who have an economic stake in the performance of
the securities they recommend, are engaging in commercial speech, but that "disinterested"
publishers are not). The court's analysis of this point need not concern the publishers of material
that is neither fraudulent nor promotional. As to the second point, the "general and regular"
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It is obvious that the court has taken an unjustifiably broad view of
"personalized" advice. First, consider Park's e-mailing of stock picks. This
is a far cry from the sort of "fiduciary, person-to-person relationships that
were discussed at length in the legislative history of the [IAA]." 23 Nowhere
does the court allege that these stock picks were actually tailored to the
individual characteristics of the recipients. 2' Park certainly did not distribute
21one list to widowed pensioners and another to technology high-rollers.
The chat room factor is also problematic. A person who answers
subscriber questions only as an incidental aspect of his publishing venture
should be distinguished from someone whose principal business is
participating in online consultation sessions. The former is more analogous
to a newspaper editor who merely publishes his responses to letters to the
editor.26
The third factor is astounding. The court essentially holds that a
recommendation that others emulate oneself is personalized because they
may actually act on the advice. Any piece of advice is personalized in the
formalistic sense that its recipients share at least one common
characteristic-namely, that they might follow the advice given. Surely this
criterion is presumably relevant only to the statutory construction of the IAA; it seems highly
unlikely that mere irregularity would reduce the applicable level of First Amendment protection
afforded to speech. See, e.g., Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result) (setting
out the constitutional rule without reference to the regularity of publication). Many classic First
Amendment cases involve speech that is not regularly disseminated, but timed to particular events
that the speaker wishes to inform others about. See, e.g.. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)
(analyzing flag-buming in response to the attempted assassination of a civil rights figure). Indeed,
on the Internet, even mainstream publications such as the Wall Street Journal are not generally
and regularly disseminated, but are updated as news arrives. One wonders, then, whether the
statutory "general and regular" criterion retains any coherence whatsoever.
23. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210 (majority opinion).
24. Cf id. at 207-08 ("The Act was designed to apply to those persons ... who provide
personalized advice attuned to a client's concerns .... ).
25. Moreover, the court is unclear when it uses the Word "individually." Is the implication
that Park was actually in the business of typing out his stock pick e-mail messages to each
subscriber, one by one? Unless Park deviated wildly from the norm in this industry, his principal
use of e-mail was through the use of distribution lists, which are analogous to impersonal
newsletters, even though the messages wind up in the inboxes of individual e-mail accounts. Cf.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 -(1997) (discussing the use of "mail exploders," more
commonly known as distribution lists).
26. See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, No. 97 C
2362, 1999 WL 965962, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1999) (considering a publisher's
communications with individual subscribers that are merely incidental to his publishing activities,
and concluding that his activities are, on the whole, impersonal); Donald E. Lively, Securities
Regulation and Freedom of the Press: Toward a Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of
Investment, 60 WASH. L. REv. 843, 860 (1985) (" [A] columnist who occasionally addressed
individual readers' questions about investments might be deemed to be giving 'personal advice'
that required regulatory control. ... [This] result would be constitutionally catastrophic.").
Another commentator notes that it is "difficult to conclude that the loose protocol and free-form
nature of chat room communications, in which personal identities may be unknown or obscured,
would.., form the foundation for a fiduciary relationship." Mills, supra note 5. Mills adds that
"there is no allegation that... [Park] provided advice or recommendations [in his chat room]
tailored to any subscriber's personal financial and investment goals and circumstances." Il
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is not the sort of personalization that the Supreme Court had in mind in
Lowe.
Lest we remain unconvinced, the court finally tells us that mere
catering to a self-selected audience is a type of personalized speech.
Following this logic, the New York Times is personalized because its
editorial pages cater to those who desire liberal commentary rather than to
the general public. It's hard to imagine any publisher who doesn't give
personalized advice, save the leafleteer who randomly stuffs his wares
through the mail slots of an unsuspecting public.
III
How did we get from Lowe to here? The answer is obvious. Courts
want to punish people who commit fraud. Lowe's statutory gloss has forced
lower courts either to give an extremely broad reading to the concept of
"personalization" or to face the prospect of letting fraudsters off the hook.
This by itself might not be a bad thing, but it has dangerous consequences
because, as Justice White explained, personalization is also relevant in
determining when an honest publisher is protected by the First
Amendment.27 Every time a court expands the scope of personalization in
order to convict someone of fraud, it potentially strips First Amendment
protection from some other legitimate publisher.
Suppose that all the allegations of Park's fraudulent conduct turned out
to be false. Imagine that he never intended to manipulate stock prices and
presented only his honest theories about where Internet stocks were headed.
Were we to accept the district court's definition of personalization, Park
would still be in trouble. He would be acting as an unregistered (that is,
unlicensed) investment adviser,28 and because his speech is "personalized,"
the First Amendment might not shield his activities from prior restraint.29
Were he to apply for a license, the SEC could deny it solely because of a
prior conviction (as in Lowe).3" (Had he been writing about commodity
futures, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) could deny
27. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result). The precise contours of
personalization as a constitutional standard are unclear. From Justice White's concurrence, we can
infer that to be licensable, advice must be personalized both in the sense that it is tailored to the
recipient's situation and that it is given in the context of some sort of "personal nexus" or person-
to-person relationship. See id. See generally Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth":
Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 885 (2000) (arguing
that under the Court's precedents, professional speech must be both tailored to the characteristics
of the recipient and given in the context of a person-to-person relationship before the government
may license it).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1994).
29. See supra note 27.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(c)(1)(G), -3(e) (1994); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183-84 (majority opinion).
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him a license simply because of his "moral turpitude" !)"' By prohibiting
unlicensed publishing, the government restricts the sources of information
available to market participants.32 The restriction is based solely on the
government's assessment of which publishers are qualified to offer advice.
That is an assessment the First Amendment normally prohibits it from
making.33
The explicit licensing of speech is not the only danger involved. By
classifying publishers like Park as professionals, courts potentially
authorize a wide array of burdensome restrictions that would otherwise be
invalid content-based regulations of speech. For example, the CFTC
requires "commodity trading advisors" to consent to on-demand audits
(essentially waiving their Fourth Amendment rights) and to supply
subscriber lists to government officials.34 While the SEC regulates with a
somewhat lighter touch,35 it is not hard to imagine it taking a more intrusive
tack at some point in the future. Requirements of this nature deter
publication and thus raise many of the same concerns as discretionary
licensing schemes.36 One can debate the merits of applying these
regulations to traditional professional advisers. But extending them to
publishers by artificially labeling their advice "personalized" is a serious
constitutional problem.
As the lower courts expand the concept of personalization in order to
extend the SEC's antifraud jurisdiction, they whittle down the First
Amendment protection of honest publishers. 7 It is freedom of speech, and
not SEC enforcement capability, that will prove to be the real casualty of
Lowe.
How can this tragedy be avoided? The obvious solution would be for
Congress to extend the antifraud provisions of the IAA to persons who, but
31. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3)(M) (1994); 17 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A (2000).
32. Cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(expounding the philosophy of the marketplace of ideas).
33. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (" [T]he
forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.").
34. 7 U.S.C. § 6n(3)(A) (1994).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1) (1994) (reporting requirements); see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 236
(White, J., concurring in the result) (stating his belief that the IAA's reporting requirements could
be enforced against even impersonal publishers).
36. E.g., Taucher v. Born, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464, 474 (D.D.C. 1999) (providing an example of
the deterrent effect of the CFTC's regulatory scheme).
37. This need not necessarily occur. The courts could adopt one definition of
"personalization" for the statutory IAA context and a different one for the constitutional context.
Indeed, to its credit, this is almost what the court did in Park. It declined to reach the
constitutional question presented because only fraudulent speech was at issue (Park was not
charged with failing to register). Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 896-98. Thus, the court technically left
open the possibility that had Park's publications not been fraudulent, he would have been
protected from licensure by the First Amendment. However, the degree to which constitutional
and statutory questions of personalization are intermingled in cases of this nature-particularly
ones alleging failure to register-makes this a perilous safeguard of First Amendment freedoms.
2001]
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for the publisher's exemption, would be investment advisers. 8 Alternately,
the Supreme Court could overrule Lowe and adopt its concurring opinion.
This would move the securities publishing industry into line with the
commodity futures publishing industry, where courts have applied the
antifraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act to publishers while
exempting them from the registration requirement on constitutional
grounds. 9 In the meantime, courts interpreting the IAA should resolve
cases on statutory grounds other than personalization, where possible.'
Avoiding constitutional doubt may be sound policy most of the time,
but there are instances in which the damage done outweighs whatever
benefit that policy is thought to offer. After all, "to be once in doubt / Is
once to be resolv'd." 41 As SEC v. Park makes plain, the Supreme Court in
Lowe made a mistake, and that mistake ought to be fixed.
-Robert Kry
38. In fact, shortly after Lowe, the SEC made a recommendation along these lines to
Congress, but it did not result in legislation. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms.,
Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on Invest. Advisers and
Fin. Planners, 99th Cong. 14 (1986) (statement of John Shad, Chairman of the SEC); see also
Ralph C. Ferrara & Gregory S. Crespi, Developments in the Regulation of Financial Planners, at
195, 217-18 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-6842, 1988)
(discussing the SEC's proposal); Lani M. Lee, The Effects of Lowe on the Application of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to Impersonal Investment Advisory Publications, 42 Bus. LAW.
507 (1987) (same).
39. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) has a narrower publisher exemption than the IAA,
so challenges to its registration provision have generally been resolved on as-applied First
Amendment grounds rather than by statutory interpretation, leaving the antifraud provisions
intact. Taucher, 53 F. Supp. 2d 464; Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, No. 97 C 2362, 1999 WL 965962 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1999); see also Exemption From
Registration as a Commodity Trading Advisor, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,938 (2000) (formally adopting the
result in Taucher). But see Ginsburg v. Agora, 915 F. Supp. 733, 737 (D. Md. 1995) (interpreting
the CEA to exclude impersonal publishers).
40. For example, the court in Park could simply have rested its ruling on the ground that
Park's publications were not bona fide because they were being used as a fraudulent vehicle for
touting and scalping. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208-09 (1985) (majority opinion); supra
note 22. The Park court's analysis of the personalization question was unnecessary.
41. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act 3, sc. 3.
